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Abstract 
 
Using a sample of Portuguese privately-held firms, I examine the association between religiosity and 
financial reporting quality. The results suggest that firms headquartered in Portuguese areas with strong 
religious adherence and in the core area of the Portuguese religious cult (the district where the Fátima 
Sanctuary is located) generally experience lower incidence of earnings management. I provide further 
evidence that the results are robust to alternative measures of religiosity, and that are not driven by firms 
headquartered in rural areas. I also conclude that religious social norms, together with other forms of 
external financial monitoring, represent a mechanism for reducing costly agency conflicts. While the 
religious practice declined in the last decades in Portugal, I provide evidence that, even in a such context, 
religiosity is associated with reduced acceptance of unethical business practices, in particular, with reduced 
acceptance of aggressive accounting practices. 
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Introduction  
The debate on the association between religiosity and economic development began early in the twentieth 
century, with Max Weber. Weber (1905) argued that the Protestantism was an important force behind the 
development of capitalism in the Northern Europe. He defended that the Protestant ethic fostered the 
individual’s rational search for economic gains. Since then, while the modern economic theory has revisited 
the analysis of religions and, in particular, psychology and management literature has examined the 
influence of religion on personal behavior, the extent to which religious attitudes affect corporate behavior 
is not well understood (McGuire et al. 2012).  
Recently, Andy Wicks, Professor of Business Administration at Darden School of Business and 
director of the Olsson Center for Applied Ethics, highlighted that religion and spirituality are fundamental 
to the identity of large portions of the global community, both individually and collectively, but scholars 
must do a better job of clarifying how business and religion are things that go together, or are an integral 
part of how business organizations (and business people) operate (Wicks 2014).  
A growing stream of research uses religion as a proxy for culture and social norms and suggests that 
religion is a key social mechanism for influencing beliefs and behaviors (Kennedy and Lawton 1998). In 
fact, consistent with the notion that a religion-based social identity and sense of belonging affects behavior 
of individuals and firms, recent literature gives evidence that local religious beliefs impact a wide range of 
corporate decisions, including financial reporting irregularities and accruals-based earnings manipulation 
(Dyreng et al. 2012, McGuire et al. 2012, Chen et al. 2013, Du et al. 2015), risk exposure (Hilary and Hui 
2009), tax avoidance (Boone et al. 2013), equity pricing (El Ghoul et al. 2012), tunneling (Du 2014), 
corporate philanthropic giving (Du et al. 2014a), and corporate environmental responsibility (Du et al. 
2014b). Although this research provides valuable insights, it is conducted in the US and more recently in 
China, leaving for sparse evidence on other denominations outside the US and the Chinese context (Du et 
al. 2015), that may have different religious configurations and different religious intensity. To begin to fill 
this gap in the literature, in this study, I examine whether religion is associated with the quality of corporate 
financial reporting, in the context of an European country, i.e., Portugal.  
In this study, religiosity is measured through the level of religious adherence in the region of the firm’s 
headquarters and through a geographic-proximity-based religion variable. Data on religiosity in Portuguese 
regions are collected from the European Values Study Longitudinal Data File (EVS 1981-2008). To 
measure earnings quality, I examine firms’ earnings management behavior with respect to abnormal 
accruals, and I employ modified versions of the Jones (1991) model and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. Using a sample of Portuguese privately-held companies over the six-year period from 2003 to 2008, 
and after controlling for several firm-level variables and region-level demographic variables, I find a 
negative association between religiosity and abnormal accruals. Specifically, the results suggest that firms 
headquartered in areas with strong religious adherence generally experience lower incidence of earnings 
management. This result holds separately for Catholic affiliation (which is the religious affiliation that 
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largely dominates Portugal). I also find evidence that firms headquartered in the core area of the Portuguese 
religious cult (the district where the Fátima Sanctuary is located) present higher financial reporting quality, 
than firms headquartered in other areas of the country. Additional tests provide evidence that the main 
results are robust to an alternative measure of religiosity, they are not driven by firms headquartered in rural 
areas, and that religious social norms may complement other forms of external financial monitoring to 
enhance the financial reporting quality. 
This study contributes to the broader literature stream that investigates the influence of religion-based 
social norms on corporate decision making (e.g., Hilary and Hui 2009, Dyreng et al. 2012, McGuire et al. 
2012, Boone et al. 2013, Chen et al. 2013, Du et al. 2015), by providing additional evidence that religiosity 
can serve as a social mechanism to mitigate earnings management behavior, and by extending the findings 
of extant literature which comes mainly from the US and more recently from China, to the European 
context.  
To my knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the association between religiosity and 
corporate financial reporting quality, in the context of a Western European country. While the US is 
overwhelmingly Christian, primarily Protestant, but has a relatively heterogeneous Christian population, 
the Western European countries are dominated by a single religious denomination (e.g., Catholics) (Hilary 
and Hui 2009). In turn, in China, the most influential religions are Buddhist and Taoist denominations (Du 
et al. 2015). This gives me the opportunity to analyse if the evidence on the relationship between religiosity 
and corporate behavior gathered from a religious diverse country (US) and from a Buddhist and Taoist 
country, holds in a context of a country dominated by the Catholic denomination. Furthermore, Iannaccone 
(1998) reports that the religious practice (e.g. weekly church attendance rates) are higher in the US than in 
European countries and that the rates of church membership in the US have increased throughout the past 
two centuries. Also, in China, religious activities were largely reduced for a long time after the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China, but currently religion revives and even thrives under atheist Communist 
rule (Du et al. 2015). In contrast, between the western European countries, it is observed a decrease in the 
religious practice and a progress towards a less pronounced religiosity (Menendez 2007). In this sense, 
studying the Portuguese setting is interesting because, although more than 90 percent of the Portuguese 
population considered themselves Roman Catholic in a cultural and religious sense (Teixeira 2011), the 
practice of religion declined in the last decades, which could be interpreted as a loss of intensity of 
religiosity (Menendez 2007).  
This study distinguishes itself from extant studies based on the US context (Hilary and Hui 2009, 
Dyreng et al. 2012, McGuire et al. 2012, Boone et al. 2013) and those based on the Chinese context (Chen 
et al. 2013, Du 2013, Du 2014, Du et al. 2014a, 2014b, 2015). While studies based on the US context 
compute religiosity at the county/region/metropolitan level (using the number of religious adherents within 
each county/region/metropolitan) and studies from the Chinese context use firm-level religion variables 
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(the number of religious sites within certain kilometers radius around a firm’s registered place), this study 
uses both approaches.  
Furthermore, the conclusions of this study may also help standard-setters, investors and regulators. As 
religious social norms potentially represent a mechanism for reducing agency costs, then, examining the 
strength of local religious social norms and how they affect managers may help standard-setters, investors 
and regulators. Understanding how religious social norms influence corporate decisions is critically 
important for shaping appropriate financial reporting standards (Sunder 2005), and may help to identify 
firms that are more or less likely to engage in actions that are costly to shareholders (McGuire et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, regulators have cited the erosion of norms as one underpinning of financial statement 
manipulation (McGuire et al. 2012).  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and the sample selection process. Section 4 presents 
the main empirical setting and results, and Section 5 concludes the study.  
 
The Portuguese Context 
Portugal has been for centuries a Roman Catholic country, not only in a religious sense, but also socially 
and culturally (Solsten 1993). 
Portugal was first Christianized while part of the Roman Empire. Christianity was solidified when the 
Visigoths, a Germanic tribe already Christianized, came into the Iberian Peninsula in the fifth century. 
Christianity was nearly extinguished in southern Portugal during Moorish rule (eighth century to twelfth 
century), but in the north it provided the cultural and religious cement that helped hold Portugal together as 
a distinctive entity (Mattoso 2000-2001).  
Under Afonso Henriques, the first king of Portugal and the founder of the Portuguese state (1139 to 
1185), church and state were unified into a lasting and mutually beneficial partnership (Solsten 1993). As 
reported by Solsten (1993), although relations between the Portuguese State and the Roman Catholic 
Church were generally amiable and stable, their relative power fluctuated. In the thirteenth century and 
fourteenth century, the Church enjoyed both riches and power stemming from its role in the reconquest and 
its close identification with early Portuguese nationalism. For a time the Church’s position vis-à-vis the 
State diminished until the growth of the Portuguese overseas empire made its missionaries important agents 
of colonization. In 1497, Portugal expelled the Jews and the remaining Moors (or forced them to convert 
to Christianity). In 1536 the pope gave King João III (1521-1557) permission to establish the Inquisition in 
Portugal to enforce the purity of the faith. Earlier the country had been rather tolerant, but now orthodoxy 
and intolerance reigned. The Jesuit order was placed in charge of all education (Mattoso 2000-2001).  
In the eighteenth century, antichurch sentiment became strong. The Marquês de Pombal (1750-1777), 
Secretary of State of the Kingdom (the equivalent to a today’s Prime Minister), expelled the Jesuits in 1759, 
broke relations with Rome, and brought education under the State’s control. Pombal was eventually 
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removed from his office, and many of his reforms were undone, but anticlericalism remained a force in 
Portuguese society. In 1821 the Inquisition was abolished, religious orders were banned, and the church 
lost much of its property (Solsten 1993). In the second half of the nineteenth century relations between 
church and state improved, but a new wave of anticlericalism emerged with the establishment of the First 
Republic in 1910 (Ferreira 2002). Not only were church properties seized and education secularized, but 
the Republic went so far as to ban the ringing of church bells, the wearing of clerical garb on the streets, 
and the holding of many religious festivals. These radical steps cost the republic popular support, and paved 
the way for its overthrow and the establishment of a conservative right-wing regime (Solsten 1993).  
From 1933 through 1974, Portugal was ruled by a corporatist dictatorship called Estado Novo and led 
by the prime-ministers Oliveira Salazar (from 1933 to 1968) and Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974) (Santos 
1984). The Estado Novo dictatorship was legitimized by the New Constitution of 1933, which defined 
Portugal as a “strong unitary and corporative State”. Interventionism, corporatism, and nationalism were 
the fundamental guidelines of the Portuguese Government at that time (Amaro 1982). Under the 
dictatorship of Salazar, the church experienced a revival. Salazar was himself deeply religious, and the 
Constitution and labor statute of 1933 were infused with Roman Catholic precepts, resulting in that Church 
and State maintained a comfortable and mutually reinforcing relationship during those times (Solsten 1993).  
The establishment of the Portuguese democracy came with the Revolution of 1974, and with the 
Portuguese Constitution of 1976, Church and State were again formally separated. Since then, Church 
continues to have a special place in Portugal, but it has no longer its former social influence (Solsten 1993). 
Traditional Roman Catholicism flourished while Portugal was overwhelmingly poor, rural, and illiterate, 
but as the country became more urban, literate, and secular, the practice of religion declined and other 
religions are now free to organize and practice their beliefs (Menendez 2007). Since 1977, it is observed a 
progressive aging among the people attending religious services weekly (Teixeira 2011). As Menendez 
(2007) argued, the decline in religious practice over the last decades could be interpreted as a loss of 
intensity of religiosity. Nevertheless, in 2011, more than 90 percent of the Portuguese population consider 
themselves Roman Catholic in a cultural and religious sense (Teixeira 2011). To Teixeira (2012), along 
with the erosion of certain religious practices and representations, in Portugal, the religious factor continues 
to keep itself an important symbolic efficiency in the construction of imaginary and affective dimensions 
of the sense of belonging to a Nation or a community. 
 
Prior literature and hypotheses development  
If we consider that business and ethics cannot reasonably be separated, and if we accept that one driver of 
individuals’ ethical beliefs is their religious beliefs, then it seems clear that an ethically reflective workplace 
will include discussions of different belief systems and how they relate to the business of doing business 
(Ray et al. 2014). 
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Religion has long been part of economic thought and both psychology and management literature has 
studied the influence of religiosity in business ethics, concluding that religion is a salient component of an 
individual’s self-identity, and that the more salient an element of one’s self-identity, the more likely it will 
be influential in social situations, and the more likely an individual is to act in accordance with the role 
expectations of his/her religion (McGuire et al. 2012).  
This point of view is fully supported by the symbolic interactionism (Burke 1980, Burke and Tully 
1977). This theoretical framework postulates that religions offer role expectations that, when internalized 
through repeated social interaction, contribute to a person’s self-identity and behavior. In other words, 
individuals occupy positions in various social structures (family, working organization, and so forth) that 
incorporate role expectations. The set of roles associated with a position, when internalized over time by 
an individual, constitutes a component of that person’s identity (Burke 1980, Burke and Tully 1977). In 
symbolic interactionist theory the greater the number and importance of interpersonal commitments based 
on a particular identity (i.e., religious believer), the more salient that identity becomes and the more likely 
this identity will be influential in social situations, and the more likely a person’s behavior will be guided 
by the role expectations associated with that identity (Weaver and Agle 2002). Weaver and Agle (2002) 
noted, however, that a religious identity need not have the same salience for each member of a particular 
religion, thus leading to individual differences in religiously influenced behavior. Yet, they also claim that 
there are categories of religious role expectations that are likely to homogenously influence ethical 
behavior, and that organizational contexts can affect the salience of a person’s religious role identity.   
Accordingly, religion-based social norms are potentially a powerful behavioral influence because they 
encompass a reward and sanctioning system that inhibits unethical or opportunistic behavior (Boone et al. 
2013). Religions provide specific ethical guidelines, emphasize the overall importance of ethical behavior, 
and provide adherents with a language or set of categories for describing and understanding experiences as 
ethical or unethical (Weaver and Agle 2002).Then, when religion is central to a person’s self-identity, he 
or she tends to hold traditional views on moral issues and has more conservative moral standards (Barnett 
et al. 1996). Fort (1997) argues that religious thought not only appeals to the many business leaders who 
follow a particular belief system but also reduces the role of self-interest, enhances moral imagination, and 
deepens moral wisdom. As described by Ray et al. (2014), one point of cohesion among the large majority 
of religions is an emphasis on the needs of the community, rather than the desires of any one individual or 
institution within it.  
In line with the idea that a religion-based social identity and sense of belonging affects individual 
behavior, recent research in accounting and finance suggests that to the extent that religious social norms 
are salient in the community, they influence the individual’s decision-making process in business life 
(Boone et al. 2013, McGuire et al. 2012). For instance, Conroy and Emerson (2004) find evidence that 
church attendance is associated with lower individual acceptance of accounting manipulation. Longenecker 
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et al. (2004) also conclude that business managers and professionals who rate their religious beliefs as 
important are significantly less likely to approve unethical business scenarios.  
Dyreng et al. (2012) argue that it is certainly plausible that the effects of religiosity at the individual 
level may be extended to the firm level, i.e., local religious beliefs impact a wide range of corporate 
decisions. Hilary and Hui (2009) further state that managerial style, corporate culture, employees’ 
preferences, and investment behavior should all be congruent, and that it would be natural to expect that 
the culture of an organization is generally aligned with the local environment of the firm. From a theological 
view point, a key insight from religion is that each firm is considered as a part of a wider community in 
every place where it operates (Ray et al. 2014).  
Local religious norms represent one type of social influence that is likely to affect the attitudes and 
culture of corporations headquartered in a given area (McGuire et al. 2012). Thus, to the extent that 
religious individuals cluster in a region, firms located in this region should employ a larger proportion of 
religious people and, as a result, the extent to which religious employees (managers in particular) tend to 
be more risk averse should be reflected in a firm’s corporate culture and its behavior (Hilary and Hui 2009).  
Recent literature, mainly from US and China, has explored the association between local religious 
beliefs and corporate decisions. Hilary and Hui (2009) find evidence that firms located in US counties with 
higher levels of religiosity (measured as the number of religious adherents within each county divided by 
total county population) display lower degrees of risk exposure, as measured by variances in equity returns 
or returns on assets. They exhibit a lower investment rate and less growth, but generate a more positive 
market reaction, when they announce new investments. Using a similar proxy for religious adherence in 
US areas, Dyreng et al. (2012) demonstrate that higher levels of religiosity are associated with a lower 
likelihood of financial restatement and with a less risk that financial statements are misrepresented because 
of overstated (understated) revenue/assets (expenses/liabilities). McGuire et al. (2012) compute a more 
comprehensive measure of religiosity for each US county, by considering three dimensions of people’s 
religiosity  (religious affiliation, attendance to religious services and importance of religion). Their study 
shows that firms headquartered in more religious areas present lower accounting risk, lower likelihood of 
accounting irregularities that result in shareholder lawsuits, and lower likelihood of accounting 
restatements. Although the negative association between religiosity and abnormal accruals, the authors also 
find a positive association between religiosity and two measures of real earnings management, suggesting 
that managers in US religious areas prefer real earnings management over accruals manipulation. In a more 
recent study Boone et al. (2013) confirm a negative relation between religiosity in the community and tax 
avoidance. They provide evidence that individual taxpayers and firms headquartered in more religious US 
counties are less likely to avoid taxes. The study of El Ghoul et al. (2012) further showed that firms located 
in more religious counties of US enjoy cheaper equity financing costs, being the effect larger for firms 
lacking alternative monitoring mechanisms. 
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Using data from the Chinese setting and based on geographic-proximity-based religion variables (the 
number of Buddhist monasteries (and Taoist temples in Du (2013) and Du et al. (2015) studies) within a 
certain radius around Chinese listed firms’ registered addresses), recent studies provide evidence that is 
consistent with that gathered in the US. Chen et al. (2013) adopt accounting misconduct and discretional 
accruals as the proxies for corporate governance and find that religion is significantly positively associated 
with corporate governance. Du (2013) uses the expense ratio as proxy for owner-manager agency costs and 
finds that religion is significantly negatively associated with owner-manager agency costs. Du (2014) 
provides evidence that Buddhism intensity is significantly negatively associated with tunneling (through 
inter-corporate loans). A very recently study of Du et al. (2015) shows that religion is significantly 
negatively associated with the extent of earnings management, but the negative association is less 
pronounced for firms with closer distance to the Chinese regulatory centers. Du et al. (2014a) provide 
further evidence that religion is significantly positively associated with Chinese listed firms’ philanthropic 
giving and, Du et al. (2014b) demonstrate that Buddhism is significantly positively associated with 
corporate environmental responsibility.  
In a more broad study, but with opposite results, Callen et al. (2011) investigated whether religion 
matters for financial reporting at the macro level (they computed financial reporting quality and religious 
variables at the country level). Using a cross-country data set (including 31 countries), their empirical tests 
indicate that earnings management is unrelated to both religious affiliation and the degree of religiosity. 
However, as suggested by Dyreng et al. (2012), the Callen et al. (2011) sample contains only 31 
observations and it is therefore unclear whether their lack of statistical results is driven by a lack of power 
of their statistical estimates.  
Overall, recent research, essentially based on data from US and China, suggests that the behavior of 
individuals, and by extension, corporate behavior, is shaped by the religious beliefs of the community in 
which the individual/firm is headquartered. It seems then, that local religious values cannot be separated 
from business life (Boone et al. 2013). In Portugal, while the practice of religion has been suffering from 
an erosion in the last decades, more than 90 percent of the population consider themselves culturally and 
religiously Catholic (Teixeira 2011) and the religious factor continues to keep itself an important symbolic 
efficiency in the construction of the sense of belonging to a community (Teixeira 2012). Thus, I predict 
that local religious values in Portugal contribute to corporate behavior, in terms of limiting opportunism in 
economic choices and outcomes. This expectation is stated formally in the first hypothesis: 
H1: Firm’s headquartered in the Portuguese areas with strong religious adherence are less likely to 
engage in earnings management behavior.  
Portugal is a country largely dominated by the Catholic religion and the Fátima sanctuary is, as 
described by Teixeira (2012), from almost a hundred years the focal point of the Portuguese Catholicism 
and the largest place of pilgrimage of the country.1 It represents the contemporary Portuguese catholic 
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“eclesiosphere” (Teixeira 2012). Every year, the Fátima sanctuary receives between four and five millions 
of visitors, rivaling with the Lourdes sanctuary in France. Since the apparition of the Virgin Mary to three 
peasant children in 1917, Fátima has gradually become a center of pilgrimage and religious cult in Portugal. 
Fátima allows the characterization of the Portuguese contemporary society beliefs (Teixeira 2012). 
According to Teixeira (2012), from a historical and anthropological view point, the pilgrimage places 
assume a fundamental role in the maintenance of a collective memory that enables the construction and 
preservation of a religious belief, and have the ability to integrate individual, family and collective interests 
and alliances. In the same line, Do et al. (2015) argue that these representative religious sites have more 
far-reaching influence because of their historical development, religious heritage, and inter-generational 
inheritance. Religious site is an indicator of the religious intensity of the people in the vicinity, and thus 
accordingly, the distance between a religious site and a firm can reflect religious influence or religious 
atmosphere in a region (Do et al. 2015).  
Being the pilgrimage places characterized by higher levels of religiosity, and based on recent research 
which gives evidence that religion-based social identity affects behavior of individuals and firms, one can 
expect that religious social norms will influence the manager’s reporting decisions in a way that firms 
headquartered in these areas will present higher financial reporting quality. This expectation leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Firm’s headquartered in the district of Fátima sanctuary (the largest center of pilgrimage and 
religious cult in Portugal) are less likely to engage in earnings management behavior than firms 
headquartered in other areas of the country.  
Research design  
Model specification  
To test the effect of religiosity on financial reporting quality (hypotheses H1 and H2) the basic regression 
model (1) is estimated: 
EQ = β0 + β1Religiosity + β2CultArea + β3FirmSize + β4FirmAge + β5ROA + β6Grow + β7Lev 
 + β8Loss + β9Tax + β10Population + β11Age + β12Income + β13Unemployment + β14Education  
+ β15Urban + β16Year + β17Industry +ε 
[1] 
 
The variables of model (1) are defined in Table 1. Measurement concepts of the dependent and test 
variables are explained in the next two Sections.  
The dependent variable in the model (EQit) is a measure of earnings quality, based on firm’s financial 
reporting quality with respect to abnormal accruals.  
The test variables are Religiosity and CultArea. Religiosity corresponds to the degree of religiosity in 
the region where the firm is located. Data on religiosity come from the European Values Study Longitudinal 
Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). CultAreait is a dummy variable taking value 1 the firm is 
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headquartered in the largest Portuguese area of religious cult (the district of Leiria, where the Fátima 
Sanctuary is located), 0 otherwise. Based on prior literature, I expect that firms headquartered in areas with 
higher religious adherence are less likely to engage in earnings management behavior.  
In addition to the variables of interest, I also control for a vector of firm-level characteristics that prior 
research suggests are associated with financial reporting quality. Data on earnings quality measures and 
firm-level characteristics come from the AMADEUS database. FirmSize is included because large 
companies have incentives to report high quality earnings as they are subject to more scrutiny from financial 
analysts and investors (Chen et al. 2005). Yet, past research also suggests that large firms manage earnings 
downward due to political costs (Haw et al. 2004, Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2006). FirmAge captures the 
fact that younger companies are less stable and are more likely to encounter financial distress and manage 
earnings to reach better profitability levels (Carey and Simnett 2006). As accruals are likely to be positively 
associated with a company’s growth opportunities, changes in sales revenue (Grow) and return on assets 
(ROA) are also included in the model (e.g., Young 1999, Johnson et al. 2002, Haw et al. 2004). Financial 
leverage (Lev) captures risk associated with higher levels of debt, that is, firms can manage earnings to 
avoid debt covenant violation or to facilitate debt renegotiations (e.g., Becker et al. 1998, Young 1999, 
Frankel et al. 2002, Carey and Simnett 2006). Loss is included as companies with continued losses are more 
likely to fail and manage earnings to hide poor performance (Carey and Simnett 2006) or facilitate debt 
renegotiations (Becker et al. 1998, Menon and Williams 2004, Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2006). Tax is 
included because in Portugal the reported earnings in individual financial statements are used for tax 
assessment and a high alignment between tax and financial accounting plays an important role in the firms’ 
reporting behavior (Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Burgstahler et al. 2006), i.e., firms can manage earnings 
for tax purposes.  
I also control for different region-level demographic characteristics (by NUTS II) that have been shown 
to be correlated with religious participation (Population, Age, Income, Unemployment, Education, and 
Urban) (Iannaccone 1998, Hilary and Hui 2009, McGuire et al. 2012). I want to make sure that Religiosity 
and CultArea capture the effect of religious adherence per se, as opposed to simply being correlated with 
the other demographic characteristics. Consistent with Hilary and Hui (2009) and McGuire et al. (2012), I 
do not have strong predictions about the association between the demographic variables and earnings 
quality (after controlling for Religiosity and CultArea). I use data obtained from the Portuguese Census 
Bureau to compute region-level demographic variables (by NUTS II). Data on demographic variables by 
NUTS II are available for 2001 and 2011. To construct region-level demographic variables for sample years 
between 2003 and 2008, I linearly interpolate the values from 2001 and 2011.  
I use the AMADEUS Company Location designation to match the region information with firm 
location. As suggested by Hilary and Hui (2009), a concern with this approach is that AMADEUS only 
reports the current location of a firm’s headquarters and therefore this introduces noise in the measurement 
of my variable. However, the number of firms that relocate is generally small and, although the magnitude 
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of the measurement error might be correlated with the dependent variable, it seems unlikely that this would 
be the case for the direction of the measurement error (Hilary and Hui 2009).  
Complete definitions of the variables in model (1) are provided in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Measuring Earnings Quality  
Prior research uses a variety of proxies to measure earnings quality which can be organised into three broad 
categories: properties of earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings, and external indicators of earnings 
misstatements (Dechow et al. 2010). I measure earnings quality by examining firms’ earnings management 
behavior with respect to abnormal accruals (e.g., Davis et al. 2009, Reichelt and Wang 2010, Gul et al. 
2013). Earnings management per se does not violate generally accepted accounting principles, but, firms 
that manage earnings are perceived as having lower quality earnings (Francis and Yu 2009).  
I employ two separate proxies to measure abnormal accruals: a modified version of the Jones (1991) 
model and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, both incorporating the asymmetric recognition of gain 
and loss in accruals as described by Ball and Shivakumar (2006). I use two separate measures of earnings 
quality to examine the robustness of the association with the religiosity variables.2 Because each measure 
of abnormal accruals has its own limitations, prior research does not rely on any single measure of earnings 
quality. Between the several alternative proxies for earnings quality available in the literature, these models 
were selected because they attempt to broadly capture earnings quality, i.e., they attempt to capture both 
intentional and unintentional factors that influence the quality of corporate earnings (DeFond 2010).  
The first approach to measure abnormal accruals is a modified version of the Jones (1991) model (Jones 
1991, Dechow et al. 1995, Teoh et al. 1998 - as described in Ferguson et al. (2004)), incorporating the 
asymmetric recognition of gain and loss in accruals as described in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
(henceforth, the Jones Model). The goal of the original Jones (1991) model was to distinguish earnings that 
would have been reported in the absence of agency cost from the self-interested earnings manipulation by 
managers. However, as stated by DeFond (2010), the original model evolved beyond simply being a proxy 
for management opportunism to being used more broadly to capture both intentional and unintentional 
factors that influence earnings quality. The second approach to measure  abnormal accruals is a variation 
of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model which incorporates the asymmetric recognition of gain and loss 
in accruals, as described in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) (henceforth, the DD Model). The Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model does not attempt to disentangle intentional estimation errors from unintentional errors 
since they imply low-quality accruals and earnings. Instead, the model assumes that even in the absence of 
intentional earnings management, accrual quality will be systematically related to firm and industry 
characteristics, i.e., the volatility of operations will systematically be related to the propensity to make 
estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev 2002). I include both in the Jones and in DD Model the asymmetric 
recognition of gain and loss in accruals, because estimating earnings quality could be improved by 
incorporating in those models the gain and loss recognition role of accruals and the nonlinearity implied by 
12 
 
the asymmetry therein (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). Finally, I use the non-signed versions of both measures 
of abnormal accruals because this allows using the whole sample and the quantification of the overall 
magnitude of earnings management regardless of the direction of accruals (Bauwhede and Willekens 2004). 
For technical details about the abnormal accruals models, see Table 1.3  
Measuring Religiosity 
Data on religiosity are obtained from the European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 
1981-2008). According to the website, the EVS is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey 
research program on basic human values.4 It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, 
values and opinions of citizens all over Europe (covering data on life, family, work, religion, politics and 
society). The EVS started in 1981, when a thousand citizens in the European Member States of that time 
were interviewed using standardized questionnaires. Every nine years, the survey is repeated in an 
increasing number of countries. The fourth wave in 2008 covers no less than 47 European countries/regions, 
from Iceland to Azerbaijan and from Portugal to Norway. In total, about 70,000 people in Europe were 
interviewed. EVS provides data on several dimensions of religiosity, including data on the number of 
religious adherents within each region of Portugal. EVS information on religiosity from Portugal at the 
region level is available for three years (1990, 1999 and 2008).  
The first variable of interest is the degree of religiosity (Religiosity) in the region where the firm is 
located. Following Boone et al. (2013), I calculate Religiosity as total number of religious adherents by 
Portuguese region (NUTS II) divided by the total residents in the region, as reported in the 1999 and 2008 
EVS surveys. More specifically, I compute Religiosity in 1999(2008) by dividing the 1999(2008) survey 
data on religious adherents by NUTS II (number of religious adherents) by the 1999(2008) data on residents 
by NUTS II (number of residents by NUTS II).5 To construct religious adherence (Religiosity) for sample 
years between 2003 and 2008 I follow prior research (Hilary and Hui 2009, Dyreng et al. 2012, Boone et 
al. 2013) and linearly interpolate the data to obtain the values in the missing years (to compute Religiosity 
in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, I linearly interpolate using the religious adherence values from 1999 
and 2008). Approximating Religiosity linearly increases the power of the tests and gives me the opportunity 
to study the time-series properties of my setting. Conceptually, the larger the fraction of the population that 
are religious adherents in a region, the larger the influence of religious social norms on corporations 
headquartered in the region (Dyreng et al. 2012). 
The second measure of religiosity, which I label of CultArea and is a dummy variable taking value one 
if a firm is headquartered in the largest Portuguese area of religious cult (the district of Leiria, where the 
Fátima sanctuary is located), zero otherwise. The reason behind the inclusion of this variable is that the 
Fátima sanctuary is, as described by Teixeira (2012), the focal point of the Portuguese Catholicism and the 
largest place of pilgrimage of the country. Because Fátima allows the portrayal of the Portuguese society 
beliefs (Teixeira 2012) and being these pilgrimage places characterized by higher levels of religiosity, one 
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can expect that religious social norms will influence the manager’s reporting decisions in a way that firms 
headquartered in these areas will present lower levels of earnings management. 
Sample 
Two different samples are created for the six-year period from 2003 to 2008: Sample A and B are designed 
to test the formulated hypotheses using the estimated abnormal accruals from the Jones Model and DD 
Model, respectively. Data for initial samples consist of all Portuguese privately held limited and joint-stock 
firms available at AMADEUS database, headquartered in Portugal and that have financial data available 
for the period of 2003 through 2008 (I use individual financial statements data), and the necessary data to 
estimate the abnormal accruals models.6, 7 Estimating the abnormal accruals models further required 
financial data for the two years prior to 2003 (the DD Model also requires financial data for the following 
year). As in prior studies (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002, Ferguson et al. 2004, Carey and Simnett 2006), 
observations for financial, insurance, and real estate institutions; public administrative/services institutions; 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing; transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services are 
excluded from the analysis, because they have specific accounting requirements, a high degree of 
complexity, and fundamental differences in the accrual generating process. Furthermore, as the accruals 
models are both estimated in the cross-sectional version, in order to efficiently estimate the regressions for 
each industry and year combination, a minimum of 10 observations per unit of analysis is imposed (i.e., the 
two-digit industry codes with less than 10 observations are eliminated).8 Finally, extreme outliers in ROA 
and Grow were eliminated.9 The sample selection process led to a final sample of 78,177 firm-years for 
Sample A, and 69,756 firm-years for Sample B. Table 2 presents the sample selection process.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Empirical results and discussion  
Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 reports summary statistics of variables used in this study. Concerning the religious adherence, Table 
3, Panel A presents geographical data by reporting the average value of religious adherents in Portuguese 
regions. The largest religious adherence is recorded in the north region of Portugal, with 95 percent of 
adherents, of which, 92 percent have Catholic affiliation. The region where is located the capital of Portugal 
(Lisboa) and southern region of the country (Alentejo) are those which present the lowest religious 
adherence and the smallest Catholic affiliation.  
Table 3, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the remaining variables. Distribution of the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals (absAwca) has a median of 0.04 both in Sample A and B.  Regarding the firm-
level control variables, which have very similar values in Sample A and Sample B, it is possible to observe 
that firms present, on average, a return on assets (ROA) and a sales growth (Grow) of 3 percent and 9 
percent, respectively. Their debt level represents about 45 percent of their total assets. Also, around 15 
percent are financially distressed companies with continued losses. More than 80 percent of the firms are 
headquartered in urban areas and, in average, 7.6 percent of the firms are located in the largest Portuguese 
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area of religious cult (the district of Leiria, where the Fátima sanctuary is located). Concerning the region-
level demographic control variables reported in Table 3. Panel C (based on data of Portuguese NUTS II 
regions), while I use the natural logarithm of each region’s population to control for skewness in that 
variable, the raw data indicate that the average population in Portuguese regions is of 1,989,865 persons. 
Additionally, the average age of residents is roughly 41 years old, the average gross domestic product is of 
43.58 Eur millions, approximately 10.2 percent of residents are unemployed, and around 14.5 percent of 
the population are college graduates.      
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4, reports the correlation matrices for variables used in this study with significance levels 
reported at the 0.05 level. As hypothesized, religiosity variables (Religiosity and CultArea) are negatively 
correlated with each measure of abnormal accruals (absAwca). The firm-level control variables are 
correlated with abnormal accruals in a manner that is broadly consistent with prior research. Table 4 further 
reports that Religiosity is negatively correlated with the average age of residents, the education level, and 
the average income. Religiosity is also positively correlated with the population level, the percentage of 
unemployed people in Portuguese regions, and also with urban areas. The significant correlation between 
the dependent and control variables underscores the importance of controlling for these variables in the 
multivariate analysis. As one might expect, the region-level demographic variables exhibit correlations with 
each other that are larger in magnitude than the correlations among the firm-level control variables. Overall, 
collinearity of Religiosity and CultArea with the control variables is not likely to be a significant issue in 
the multiple regressions.10   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Multivariate Results 
Table 5 presents the results of several multivariate tests that investigate the association between religiosity 
and corporate financial reporting quality. The first and third models in Table 5 are estimated using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level, and with year- and 
industry-fixed effects controlled. The year and industry indicators (dummies) controls for common shocks 
which could cause cross-sectional correlation in the errors. The firm-level robust clustering of standard 
errors corrects for heteroskedasticity and for the possibility of serial correlation attributable to unobserved 
firm effects that cause serial correlation in the errors. The second and fourth models in Table 5 are estimated 
using a firm-level random-effect model (RE) (with robust standard errors) that control for the omitted-
variables threat (the concern is that variables may be correlated with the error term but not included in the 
model). 11 Since the results are consistent in the models estimations using OLS regression or the RE 
approach, I discuss the results in a general sense. The R-squared indicate that the models are successful in 
explaining some of the variance in abnormal accruals.  
In line with H1, I expect that firms headquartered in the Portuguese areas with strong religious 
adherence are less likely to engage in earnings management. Consistent with this prediction, and after 
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controlling for several firm-level variables and region-level demographic variables, Table 5 shows a 
statistically significant negative association between Religiosity and absAWCA in all the models. I interpret 
this result as evidence in support of H1 that firms located in areas with strong religious adherence are less 
likely to engage in earnings management behavior. The evidence collected in this study is in line with extant 
research which documents that local religious beliefs are related with a wide range of corporate decisions, 
including financial reporting irregularities and accruals-based earnings manipulation (Dyreng et al. 2012, 
McGuire et al. 2012, Chen et al. 2013, Du et al. 2015), risk exposure (Hilary and Hui 2009), and tax 
avoidance (Boone et al. 2013).  
Table 5 also presents a statistically significant negative relation between CultArea and absAWCA in all 
the models (and after controlling for several firm-level variables and region-level demographic variables). 
I interpret this result as evidence that firms headquartered in the largest center of pilgrimage and religious 
cult in Portugal (the district of Fátima sanctuary) are less likely to engage in earnings management behavior 
than firms headquartered in other areas of the country. This result supports H2, and is in line with the 
argument that the pilgrimage places assume a fundamental role in the maintenance of a collective memory 
that enables the construction and preservation of a religious belief, and have the ability to integrate 
individual, family and collective interests (Teixeira 2012). The evidence collected in this study suggests 
these pilgrimage places reinforce the religion-based social identity, which in turn affects behavior of 
individuals and firms, in a way that firms headquartered in these areas present higher financial reporting 
quality.  
Consistent with recent research (Dyreng et al. 2012, McGuire et al. 2012, Boone et al. 2013, Chen et 
al. 2013, Du et al. 2015), the results suggest that the behavior of individuals, and by extension, corporate 
behavior, is shaped by the religious beliefs of the community in which the firm is headquartered, even in a 
context where the religious intensity decreased in the last decades. 
Results for control variables show that, in line with Chen et al. (2005) and Carey and Simnett (2006) 
arguments, the coefficients for FirmSize and FirmAge reveal that higher and older firms present higher 
financial reporting quality. The coefficients for ROA and Grow suggest significant evidence that firms with 
high grow opportunities tend to engage in earnings management behavior. As suggested by Francis and Yu 
(2009), growth firms may have greater incentives to manage earnings in order to meet market expectations 
or to meet (beat) earnings benchmarks. In line with past research (Carey and Simnett 2006, Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen 2006), the coefficients for Lev and Loss, suggest that companies with higher levels of debt 
and/or with continued losses present lower earnings quality. The coefficients on Tax are not statistically 
significant. Finally, several region-level demographic variables are associated with earnings quality. In 
particular, firms headquartered in urban areas (Urban) are more likely to engage in earnings management 
behavior.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Supplemental Analyses  
An Aggregate Measure of Religiosity and Earnings Quality 
According to past research, religiosity is defined by three distinct elements: cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral (Parboteeah et al. 2008). Therefore, similar to McGuire et al. (2012), I compute a comprehensive 
(alternative) measure of region-level religiosity and I examine its relationship with financial reporting 
quality.  
To develop the comprehensive measure I use responses to three questions asked by EVS survey of 
2008, that correspond to the three distinct elements of religiosity defined above: (1) Are you affiliated with 
a religion? (cognitive dimension; answers: 1= yes; no = 0); (2) How important is religion in your life? 
(affective dimension; answers fall on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1= not important at all, and 4= very 
important); and (3) How often do you attend religious services? (behavioral dimension; answers fall in a 
scale from 1 to 7, where 1= never, and 7= more than once in a week). I first compute three measures at 
region-level, one for each religious dimension, which I call ReligiousAF, ReligiousImp and ReligiousAT. 
Each of these three measures corresponds to the sum of the answers to the EVS interview question, divided 
by the number of residents in each region (as reported in EVS 2008 data file). I then estimate an aggregate 
measure of region-level of religiosity, which I call AggReligiosity and corresponds to the average of the 
three measures of religiosity (by NUTS II). I only computed the aggregate measure of religiosity to the year 
2008, because making the analysis to the total sample implies estimating the three distinct dimensions of 
religiosity by linear interpolation to the missing years, and not being the respondents to the EVS surveys of 
1999 and 2008 the same, estimating the affective and behavioral dimensions of religiosity by linear 
interpolation is quite subjective.  
Table 6 provides the results of the re-estimation of the main model in cross-section for the year 2008, 
and reveals that the coefficient of the aggregate measure of religiosity (AggReligiosity) remains 
significantly negative both in Jones and DD model, thus confirming that firms headquartered in areas with 
strong religious adherence are less likely to engage in earnings management.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Religion in Urban versus Rural Areas 
Past research advocates that rural areas are generally characterized by higher levels of religiosity and, thus, 
firms located in those areas have higher earnings quality than firms located in urban areas (Dyreng et al. 
2012, McGuire et al. 2012, Boone et al. 2013).  
To rule out that the main results regarding the influence of religion on financial reporting quality are 
not driven by firms headquartered in rural areas, I replicate the main tests using a subsample of firms 
headquartered in Portuguese urban areas. I use data obtained from the Portuguese Census Bureau to 
distinguish urban from rural areas of the country. The Portuguese Census Bureau considers a region (by 
NUTS II) as urban when the population density is equal or higher than 100 residents per square kilometre.  
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Table 7, presents the results of the multivariate tests of the relation between religiosity and earnings 
quality within a subsample of firms headquartered in Portuguese urban regions. Religiosity and CultArea 
remain negatively and statistically significantly related with earnings management. Therefore, the 
association between religiosity and financial reporting quality that I document in the main tests cannot be 
solely attributed to a rural versus urban firm phenomenon.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Religion and External Financial Monitoring  
McGuire et al. (2012) argue that if religious social norms help to deter financial reporting irregularities 
within a firm, it is possible that the association between religiosity and earnings management will be less 
important for firms that already have their financial reporting system under high levels of external 
monitoring. Alternatively, religious social norms could complement other forms of external monitoring. 
Consequently, I examine whether the relation between religiosity and earnings quality varies in subsamples 
of firms whose financial statements are subject (or not) to financial audits.  
In Portugal, the financial statements audit is only mandatory when it results from a legal, statutory, or 
contractual requirement, or for firms that have (or are required to have) an accounting system organized in 
accordance with the Portuguese Accounting Standards and meet the requirements laid down in article 
262(2) of the Portuguese Companies Act (companies that meet, during two years, at least two of the 
following criteria: total assets greater than 1,500,000 euros/year, turnover level greater than 3,000,000 euros 
and with more than 50 employees). The vast majority of the Portuguese companies are small firms whose 
financial statements are not mandatorily audited.  
As reported by Cosserat (2005), the main objectives of a financial audit are to obtain a reasonable 
assurance about the correctness of the accounts, detect fraud and errors, and provide an independent opinion 
on the truth and fairness of the financial statements, thus enhancing the degree of confidence of intended 
users in the financial statements.  
I define firms whose financial statements are subject to a financial audit as having external financial 
monitoring. Table 8 reports the results of the multivariate tests of the relation between religiosity and 
earnings quality within subsamples of firms whose financial statements are subject (or not) to financial 
audits. I find a statistically negatively relation between earnings management and both measures of 
religiosity (Religiosity and CultArea), equally in the subsample of audited firms and non-audited firms. 
Likewise, the results suggest that religious social norms could complement other forms of external financial 
monitoring. The results remain qualitatively similar when I analyse whether the relation between religiosity 
and earnings quality varies in subsamples of firms audited by Big Four audit firms/Non-Big Four audit 
firms (untabulated results reveal that Religiosity and CultArea remain significantly negative in both 
subsamples).  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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Additional Robustness Tests  
In untabulated analyses, I perform a number of additional robustness tests to provide support for the main 
results. First, I examine whether the main results are robust to alternative calculations of abnormal accruals. 
The Jones Model and the DD Model are alternatively estimated from pooled data using within-industry 
observations, and also based in total accruals. Untabulated results reveal that these procedures do not 
materially affect the main findings (i.e., the coefficient of Religiosity and CultArea remain significantly 
negative).  
Second, I analyse whether inferences collected in the main analysis are robust to an alternative 
specification of religiosity. Being Portugal largely dominated by Catholic religion (Teixeira 2012), I use an 
alternative measure of religiosity which is computed as the ratio of religious adherents with catholic 
affiliation in the region to the residents in the region (NUTSII). As before, I use data from EVS survey and 
I linearly interpolate values from 1999 and 2008 to generate the religiosity variable values for the sample 
years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. Untabulated re-estimations of the main model show that the 
coefficient of the alternative specification of Religiosity remains significantly negative.  
Third, although I apply several techniques to address potential endogeneity, it is possible that firms 
with specific characteristics (omitted from the analysis) prefer to locate in more religious areas. Extant 
research suggests that endogeneity is not a major threat since the choice of corporate headquarters location 
is driven by proximity to customers, suppliers, and production inputs (El Ghoul et al. 2012). Yet, I control 
for the potential endogeneity between religion and earnings management by following prior research (El 
Ghoul et al. 2012, Du et al. 2015), and I re-estimate the baseline regression model by narrowing the samples 
to firms from the mining, construction, wholesale and retail sectors.12 John et al. (2011) argue that firms is 
these sectors show a pronounced tendency to locate in areas reflecting the nature of their production process, 
being not likely to be driven by religious considerations. Despite the reduction in power due to the smaller 
sample size (Sample A, now contains 51,325 firm-years and Sample B 45,380 firm-years), coefficients of 
Religiosity and CultArea remain significantly negative at the 5% level. This evidence helps dispel concerns 
that self-selection bias is spuriously responsible for the core results. 
Conclusion   
Prior research provides evidence that local religious beliefs influence a wide range of corporate decisions, 
such as financial reporting irregularities (Dyreng et al. 2012, McGuire et al. 2012, Chen et al. 2013, Du et 
al. 2015), risk exposure (Hilary and Hui 2009, El Ghoul et al. 2012), tax avoidance (Boone et al. 2013), 
and corporate environmental responsibility (Du et al. 2014b). Despite the relevant information that research 
provides, it only reflects the US and China settings, leaving for scarce evidence on other contexts, and 
different countries may have diverse religious intensity and different religious configurations. 
This study extends this line of research to an European country, and examines the association between 
religiosity and financial reporting quality. Although Portugal has experienced a decrease in religious 
practices over the past decades, I find evidence that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious 
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adherence generally experience lower incidence of earnings management. This result holds separately for 
Catholic affiliation. I also document that firms headquartered in the core area of the Portuguese religious 
cult (the district where the Fátima Sanctuary is located) present higher earnings quality than firms 
headquartered in other areas of the country. In additional analyses, I provide further evidence that the results 
are robust to an alternative measure of religiosity, that are not driven by firms headquartered in rural areas, 
and that religious social norms may complement other forms of external financial monitoring in promoting 
earnings quality. In line with past research (Dyreng et al. 2012, McGuire et al. 2012, Boone et al. 2013, 
Chen et al. 2013, Du et al. 2015), the main results in this study suggest that local religious values stimulate 
individual’s ethical behavior and, by extension, corporate behavior, thus representing a mechanism for 
reducing costly agency conflicts, and promoting corporate earnings quality.  
Still, I acknowledge that the inference is subject to some caveats. First, an inherent limitation stems 
from the abnormal accruals models used to measure earnings quality, as past research documents that they 
have residual problems and are subject to some potential measurement error. Thus, the validity of the main 
results is subject to the efficiency of those models. Second, and similar to that described by Dyreng et al. 
(2012), I cannot directly measure the religious affiliation of individual managers. As such, I acknowledge 
that the inability to directly measure religious adherence is a limitation of this study. Third, despite I 
consider the interaction between religious adherence and a financial statements audit, due to lack of data, I 
cannot control for the interaction between religiosity and other governance mechanisms and this may be an 
important area of inquiry (Dyreng et al. 2012, McGuire et al. 2012). Finally, while I apply several 
techniques to address this problem, I recognize that the empirical analysis can still suffer from endogeneity. 
Future research may expand the analysis from a single country to a cross-country European setting. 
 
1 According to Teixeira (2012) around eighty percent of the Portuguese population is catholic and more than ninety percent of 
the Portuguese population with religious affiliation is catholic. Also, Portugal is a small country with many pilgrimage places, 
but none of them has the influence of the Fátima Sanctuary. 
2 The correlation between the abnormal accruals values (absAWCA) obtained from the Jones Model and the DD Model is 0.52 
(significant at the one percent level).    
3 The Jones and DD models that I use focus exclusively on the working capital component of accruals because it appears that 
working capital accruals are more likely than other accruals to be subject to manipulations (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003). 
4 http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/frmShowpage?v_page_id=4386315781860116. 
5 EVS 1999 survey only contains data on Religiosity by NUTS II, data by NUTS I were not available. So, I calculate Religiosity 
only by NUTS II. Furthermore, as described by McGuire et al. (2012) and Boone et al. (2013), measuring religiosity across a 
broader geographical unit is preferable over using county-level religiosity measures because in many urban areas, people 
commute to city from any one of numerous surrounding counties. Using a broader geographical unit reduces the likelihood of 
representing inaccurately the religiosity of local populations surrounding company headquarters.  
6 I choose to perform the analysis among privately held firms because they are the vast majority of the Portuguese companies. 
According to the Portuguese Census Bureau firms working in Portugal are small firms (in 2012, 96 percent were small firms 
with less than 10 employees). Also, the number of listed companies is very small (in average, 50 firms were listed in the Euronext 
Lisbon, from 2000 to 2012). Furthermore, as stated by Burgstahler et al. (2006), private and listed firms are fundamentally 
different, as private firms are less reliant on earnings to communicate firm performance (relative to listed firms, private firms 
have relatively concentrated ownership structures and can efficiently communicate among shareholders via private channels) it 
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is of less concern if they make earnings less informative in the process of managing earnings to minimize taxes (given the high 
alignment between tax and financial accounting in Portugal).  
7 In this study I use individual financial statements of privately held firms (unlisted) to infer the quality of the reported earnings 
of firms to the six-year period from 2003 to 2008. As described by Guerreiro et al. (2012), in Portugal, the Sistema de 
Normalização Contabilística (SNC) (Portuguese Accounting Standards) came into force in January 2010. SNC is the IFRS 
adaptation to the Portuguese context and to be followed by unlisted companies. In the period 2005–2009, Portuguese law allowed 
unlisted companies to use IFRS in both the consolidated and individual accounts. However, the voluntary adoption of IFRS in 
individual accounts was under two conditions: first, that companies maintained another accounting system for individual 
accounts in accordance with the national accounting system; and second, that companies must have had their accounts publicly 
certified. Thus, the transition from Portuguese GAAP to IFRS does not affect the measures of earnings quality computed in this 
study. 
8 Examples of studies that estimated the cross-sectional or time-series versions of the Jones-type models that required a minimum 
of about 10 observations for efficiently estimating the regression parameters include Haw et al. (2004) and Gul et al. (2013).  
9 I constructed box plot graphics for all the variables but only ROA and Grow revealed the presence of severe outliers, so that 
the minimum value of ROA was winsorized at -0.25, and the maximum value of Grow was winsorized at 5. 
10 I confirmed this by examining the VIF in the multiple regressions, and in all instances, the VIF was below the threshold of 
10 that has been suggested in literature as indicative of a multicollinearity problem.   
11 Greene (2007) indicates that both fixed-effect and random-effect models control for omitted variables in panel data. A 
Hausman specification test (not reported) shows that a random-effect model is more appropriate to test Model (1) and given the 
short time series of six years in my data, and the low within-variation of the test variable (variation of Religiosity at the firm level 
over time is low), I chose a firm-level random-effect model to test the model. 
12 El Ghoul et al. (2012) and Du et al. (2015) also included in their samples firms from the agriculture and utilities sectors. In 
this study, these sectors were removed during the sample selection process, because they have fundamental differences in the 
accrual generating process (see the Sample subsection for more details). 
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Table 1 – Definition of Variables  
Panel A. Dependent Variable - EQit - a measure of earnings quality of firm i in year t 
 
absAWCAit 
 
Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by lagged total assets of firm i in year t, computed 
through modified versions of the Jones (1991) model (Jones, 1991, Dechow et al. 1995, Teoh et al. 1998 - henceforth 
the Jones Model) and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (henceforth the DD Model), both incorporating the 
asymmetric recognition of gain and loss in accruals as described in Ball and Shivakumar (2006). 
 
The Jones Model  - Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals are the residuals of the following model: 
WCAit/TAit-1 =  β0(1/TAit-1)+β1[(∆REVit – ∆RECit)/ TAit-1]+ β2CFOit+β3DCFOit + 
                               β4DCFOit*CFOit +β5∆CFOit + β6D∆CFOit + β7D∆CFOit*∆CFOit + εit 
where:  
WCAit = working capital accruals of firm i in year t, computed as (change in current assets – change in cash/cash 
equivalents cash) – (change in current liabilities – change in short-term debt);     
TAit-1 = total assets of firm i in year t-1;  
∆REVit = change in sales revenues of firm i in year t;  
∆RECit = change in accounts receivable of firm i in year t;  
Proxies for the asymmetric recognition of gain and loss in accruals:* 
CFOit = cash flow from operations of firm i in year t, computed indirectly by subtracting the accrual 
component from earnings: CFO = operating income – working capital accruals  (this procedure was used 
because direct information on firm’s CFO was not presented in a widely form in AMADEUS database; also, 
in Portugal, firms under certain size are not are required to prepare cash flow statements);  
DCFOit = dummy variable taking value 1 if CFOit < 0 and 0 otherwise, of firm i in year t; 
DCFOit*CFOit of the firm i in year t;  
∆CFOit = CFOit – CFOit-1 of firm i in year t;  
D∆CFOit = dummy variable taking value 1 if ∆CFOit < 0 and 0 otherwise, of firm i in year t;  
D∆CFOit*∆CFOit of firm i in year t. 
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets (Coppens and Peek 2005, Carey and Simnett 2006). 
 
* Ball and Shivakumar (2006) used four different proxies for the asymmetric recognition of gain and loss in accruals, 
three of them financial reporting (“book”) measures (level of cash flows, change in cash flows, and industry-adjusted 
cash-flows) and the fourth based on stock market returns. Due to data restrictions the proxy based on stock market 
returns is not used. Also, the industry-adjusted cash-flows proxy is not used because as Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 
p. 216) indicate, this proxy “ignores gains and losses from industry-wide shocks to current and future cash flows”. 
 
Jones (1991) estimated the original model using long time-series of firms. However, to make a reliable estimation 
of abnormal accruals using the time-series approach it is necessary a minimum of observations over the period 
(usually 10 years of data). Due to sample restrictions, I estimate Jones Model cross-sectionally over the investigation 
period (2003 to 2008). This approach is widely used in the literature (Jones et al. 2008, Dechow et al. 2011). First, 
OLS is used to estimate separate regressions for each two-digit Portuguese SIC code (CAE – Rev. 2.1 – Classificação 
das Atividades Económicas) and year combination to obtain industry-specific estimates of β (it are included 26 
industry year-groups and at least 10 observations are required per industry-year combination; given all industry-year 
combinations the median value of observations is of 220 firms and the mean value of the adjusted R-squared is of 
0.76). The fitted coefficients are then used to derive normal accruals for the sample of firms. Abnormal accruals are 
defined as the residual from the regression of firm i in year t. Higher values of absAWCAit indicate lower earnings 
quality.   
 
 
 The DD Model - Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals are the residuals of the following model: 
                       WCAit = β0 + β1CFOit-1 + β2CFOit  + β3CFOit+1 + β4DCFOit  + β5DCFOit*CFOit + 
β6∆CFOit  + β7D∆CFOit + β8D∆CFOit*∆CFOit  + εit 
where:  
WCAit = working capital accruals of firm i in year t;     
CFOit-1 = cash flow from operations of firm i in year t-1; 
CFOit = cash flow from operations of firm i in year t; 
CFOit+1 = cash flow from operations of firm i in year t+1;  
The proxies for asymmetric recognition of gain and loss in accruals (CFOit; DCFOit; DCFOit*CFOit; ∆CFOit; 
D∆CFOit; D∆CFOit*∆CFOit) are those used in the Jones Model. ∆CFOit is not included as a separate variable in the 
regressions because it induced perfect correlation with the independent variables used to explain accruals. 
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets (Dechow and Dechev, 2002; Carey and Simnett, 2006). 
Originally, Dechow and Dechev (2002) estimate their model using a firm-level time-series regression approach 
(requiring at least eight years of data to estimate the model) and consider the standard deviation of the firm-specific 
residuals as a firm-level measure of accrual quality, where higher standard deviation denoted lower quality. I do not 
have eight years of data for all the firms, so I estimate the DD Model through the cross-sectional version, over the 
investigation period (2003 to 2008). I estimate separate regressions (OLS) for each two-digit Portuguese SIC code 
and year combination to obtain industry-specific estimates of β (it are included 26 industry-year groups and at least 
10 observations are required per industry-year combination; given all industry-year combinations, the median value 
of observations is of 179 firms and the mean value of the adjusted R-squared is of 0.79). The fitted coefficients are 
then used to derive normal accruals for the sample of firms and the error term from the regressions is computed by 
deducting the estimated accruals from the working capital accruals component and considered as a measure of 
accrual and earnings quality. Higher residuals values denote higher abnormal accruals and lower earnings quality. 
Jones et al. (2008) and Gul et al. (2013) use a similar approach to estimate the Dechow and Dechev (2002) model. 
                                                                                                                                                          (Continued) 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables (Continued) 
Panel A. Dependent Variable - EQit - a measure of earnings quality of firm i in year t  
Panel B. Test Variable  
Religiosity- a measure of religious adherence by region (NUTS II), defined as the total number of religious adherents by 
Portuguese region (NUTS II) divided by the total residents in the region. 
I use data reported in the 1999 and 2008 EVS surveys to calculate Religiosity for 1999 and 2008. I compute Religiosity in 
1999(2008) by dividing the 1999(2008) survey data on religious adherents by NUTS II (number of religious adherents) by the 
1999(2008) data on residents by NUTS II (number of residents by NUTS II). To construct Religiosity in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
and 2007, I linearly interpolate using the religious adherence values from 1999 and 2008.  
 
CultArea - a dummy variable taking value 1 if if firm i in year t is headquartered in the largest Portuguese area of religious cult 
(the district of Leiria, where the Fátima Sanctuary is located), 0 otherwise. 
Panel C. Firm-Level Control Variables    
FirmSize  Size of the firm, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. 
FirmAge  Age of the firm, defined as the natural logarithm of the lifetime (in years) of firm i in year t. 
ROA Return on assets, defined as net income scaled by total assets, of firm i in year t. 
Grow Sales growth, defined as change in sales revenues scaled by sales revenues in year t-1, of firm i in year t. 
Lev Financial leverage ratio, defined as total liabilities scaled by total assets, of firm i in year t. 
Loss 
Firm with continued losses, defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 if firm i in year t-1 reported a loss 
(negative operating income), 0 otherwise. 
Tax The natural logarithm of income tax, of firm i in year t 
 
Panel D. Demographic Control Variables (defined by NUTS II) – region-level demographic variables for 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, and 2007 are computed by interpolating data from 2001 and 2008 provided by the Portuguese Census Bureau.   
Population The natural logarithm of the population for each region in millions. 
Age Average age of residents in each region. 
Income The gross domestic product for each region (in EUR millions). 
Unemployment Percentage of unemployed resident population, by region. 
Education Percentage of resident population by region, with completed college education. 
Urban 
Urban region, defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 if the population density in the region is equal or 
higher than 100 residents per square kilometre (this is the Portuguese Census Bureau criterion to consider a 
region as urban), 0 otherwise. Population density is computed as the ratio of the total population in the region 
over the total area of the region.       
  
Year Year dummies 
Industry  Industry Indicators 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample-selection process  
Sample-selection process 
Sample A (Jones Model) Sample B (DD Model) 
No. of firm-years 
obs. removed 
No. of firm-years 
obs. remaining 
No. of firm-years 
obs. removed 
No. of firm-years 
obs. remaining 
Initial sample of privately held Portuguese limited 
and joint-stock companies in AMADEUS database 
that had:   
- Headquarters in Continental Portugal, 
- Financial data available in the AMADEUS 
database for the period of 2003 to 2008,  
- Available financial data for the two previous 
years (the DD Model sample also required firms 
to have financial data available for the 
following year),  
- The necessary data to estimate the Jones Model 
and the DD Model. 
Excluding observations from the following 
industries: agriculture, forestry and fishing; 
transportation, communications, electric, gas and 
sanitary services; financial, insurance and real estate 
institutions; public administrative/services 
institutions; 
Excluding industries (at the two-digit code of the 
Portuguese SIC) with less than ten observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76,729 
 
 
 
 
45 
250,813 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174,039* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82,101 
 
 
 
 
46 
251,138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168,991** 
Excluding firms lacking the necessary data in several 
firm-level control variables (FirmAge, ROA, and 
Tax). 
95,623  99,082  
Excluding extreme values of ROA and Grow 239  153  
Final sample   78,177  69,756 
Notes: * The industry-specific βs in the Jones Model are estimated in this sample. 
            ** The industry-specific βs in the DD Model are estimated in this sample. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Table 4. Pearson Correlations 
 
 
 
Panel A: Statistics for components of religiosity by Portuguese regions (NUTS II) 
 Religious Adherence (ratio of religious adherents 
to total residents in the region) 
Catholic Affiliation  (ratio of catholic adherents to total 
residents in the region) 
Norte 0.95 0.92 
Centro 0.86 0.83 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 0.82 0.73 
Alentejo 0.73 0.70 
Algarve 0.91 0.89 
Panel B: Statistics for firm-level control variables 
Variable 
Sample A (Jones Model) Sample B (DD Model) 
n Mean Median Std. Dev. n Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Continuous         
absAwca 78,177 0.06 0.04 0.07 69,756 0.08 0.04 0.12 
Size 78,177 14.1 14.2 1.61 69,756 14.07 14.10 1.65 
Age 78,177 2.67 2.77 0.75 69,756 2.67 2.77 0.74 
ROA 78,177 0.03 0.02 0.06 69,756 0.03 0.02 0.07 
Grow 78,177 0.09 0.03 0.42 69,756 0.08 0.03 0.42 
Lev 78,177 0.46 0.45 0.40 69,756 0.44 0.42 0.38 
Tax 78,177 8.87 8.95 2.22 69,756 8.81 8.86 2.25 
Discrete n %   n %   
Loss (=1) 11,749 15.0   10,724 15.4   
Urban (=1) 62,635 80.1   56,173 80.5   
CultArea (=1) 5,905 7.6   5,270 7.6   
Panel C: Statistics for region-level demographic variables (based on data of Portuguese NUTS II) 
  Mean Median Std. Dev.     
Population  14.50 14.40 0.45     
Age  40.70 40.50 1.45     
Income  43.58 47.39 14.8     
Unemployment  10.16 10.22 1.47     
Education  14.48 11.21 3.60     
Variable Definitions: absAwca = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (computed through the Jones and DD Models); 
Religion = ratio of religious adherents in the region to the population in the region; CultArea = 1 if firm is located the district of Leiria 
(where Fátima sanctuary is located), 0 otherwise; FirmSize = natural logarithm of total assets; FirmAge = the natural logarithm of the firm 
lifetime (in years); ROA = net income scaled by total assets; Grow = sales growth, defined as change in sales revenues scaled by sales 
revenues in year t-1; Lev = total liabilities scaled by total assets; Loss = 1 if firm reported negative operating income in year t-1, 0 otherwise; 
Tax = natural logarithm of income tax;  Population = natural logarithm of the population for each region in millions; Age = average age of 
residents in each region; Income = gross domestic product for each region (in EUR millions); Unemployment = percentage of unemployed 
resident population, by region; Education = percentage of resident population by region, with completed college education;Urban =1 if firm 
is located in a urban region, 0 otherwise. 
Pearson correlations: below the diagonal for Sample A, above the diagonal for Sample B 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  
absAwca 1 
S
a
m
p
le
  
A
 (
J
o
n
es
 M
o
d
el
) 
 -0.04 -0.02 -0.24 -0.11 0.15 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.04 0.17 0.10 -0.02 
S
a
m
p
le B
 (D
D
 M
o
d
el) 
Religiosity 2 -0.03  -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.39 -0.60 -0.11 0.22 -0.57 0.21 
CultArea 3 -0.02 -0.01  0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.35 -0.25 -0.29 -0.17 0.14 
Size 4 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01  0.32 -0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.09 0.47 0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.29 -0.04 0.08 
Age 5 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 0.32  -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.03 0.19 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.06 
ROA 6 0.36 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07  0.14 -0.11 -0.20 0.39 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 
Grow 7 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.15  0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lev 8 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.02  0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.21 -0.07 0.01 
Loss 9 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.18 0.05 0.05  -0.28 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.01 
Tax 10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.45 0.18 0.38 0.08 -0.05 -0.28  0.01 -0.12 0.01 -0.25 -0.02 0.08 
Population 11 -0.03 0.39 -0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.37 0.39 0.05 0.08 0.44 
Age 12 0.02 -0.60 0.34 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 -0.38  -054 -0.26 -0.07 -0.30 
Income 13 0.04 -0.11 -0.25 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.40 -0.34  0.38 0.41 0.35 
Unemployment 14 0.10 0.22 -0.30 -0.29 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.19 0.04 -0.24 0.05 -0.27 0.38  0.36 -0.03 
Education 15 0.08 -0.58 -0.17 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.07 0.41 0.36  0.05 
Urban 16 -0.01 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.44 -0.31 0.36 -0.03 0.06  
Notes: Data cover years from 2003 to 2008 and contain 78,177 observations in Sample A and 69,756 in Sample B. Bold numbers indicate two-tailed significance at the 
0.05 level(**). 
Variable Definitions: absAwca = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (computed through the Jones and DD Models); Religion = ratio of religious 
adherents in the region to the population in the region; CultArea = 1 if firm is located the district of Leiria (where Fátima sanctuary is located), 0 otherwise; FirmSize 
= natural logarithm of total assets; FirmAge = the natural logarithm of the firm lifetime (in years); ROA = net income scaled by total assets; Grow = sales growth, 
defined as change in sales revenues scaled by sales revenues in year t-1; Lev = total liabilities scaled by total assets; Loss = 1 if firm reported negative operating income 
in year t-1, 0 otherwise; Tax = natural logarithm of income tax;  Population = natural logarithm of the population for each region in millions; Age = average age of 
residents in each region; Income = gross domestic product for each region (in EUR millions); Unemployment = percentage of unemployed resident population, by 
region; Education = percentage of resident population by region, with completed college education;Urban =1 if firm is located in a urban region, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5. Religiosity and Earnings Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exp 
sign 
Sample A (Jones Model) Sample B (DD Model) 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
RE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
RE 
Religiosity − -0.036***   -0.033**   -0.062**   -0.064**   
(0.015)    (0.018)    (0.027)    (0.033)    
CultArea − -0.003***    -0.004***    -0.006***    -0.007***    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
FirmSize +/− -0.004***     -0.004***     -0.008***     -0.009***     
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
FirmAge − -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
ROA + 0.460*** 0.395*** 0.315*** 0.274*** 
(0.023)    (0.019)    (0.018)    (0.016)    
Grow + 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
(0.002)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Lev + 0.018***     0.016***     0.013***     0.012***     
(0.004)    (0.006)    (0.003)    (0.003)    
Loss +    0.024***    0.009***    0.024***    0.009*** 
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Tax − -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Population +/− -0.009* -0.011** -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age +/− -0.002** -0.001* -0.004*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income +/− 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment +/− 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education +/− 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban + 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 78,177 78,177 69,756 69,756 
R2 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.31 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Both the OLS and RE regressions include 
robust standard errors (clustered by firm in the OLS regression). Each column reports the coefficient estimate followed by 
the standard error in parentheses. 
Variable Definitions: absAwca = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (computed through the Jones and 
DD Models); Religion = ratio of religious adherents in the region to the population in the region; CultArea = 1 if firm is 
located the district of Leiria (where Fátima sanctuary is located), 0 otherwise; FirmSize = natural logarithm of total assets; 
FirmAge = the natural logarithm of the firm lifetime (in years); ROA = net income scaled by total assets; Grow = sales 
growth, defined as change in sales revenues scaled by sales revenues in year t-1; Lev = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
Loss = 1 if firm reported negative operating income in year t-1, 0 otherwise; Tax = natural logarithm of income tax;  
Population = natural logarithm of the population for each region in millions; Age = average age of residents in each region; 
Income = gross domestic product for each region (in EUR millions); Unemployment = percentage of unemployed resident 
population, by region; Education = percentage of resident population by region, with completed college education;Urban 
=1 if firm is located in a urban region, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 6. An Aggregate Measure of Religiosity and Earnings Quality 
 
Table 7. Religiosity and Earnings Quality in Urban Areas 
 
Exp 
sign 
Sample A (Jones Model) Sample B (DD Model) 
(1) (2) 
AggReligiosity − 
-0.025**   -0.050*   
(0.014)    (0.042)    
FirmSize 
+/− 
-0.024***     -0.044***     
(0.001)    (0.007)    
FirmAge 
− 
-0.016*** -0.039** 
(0.001)    (0.018)    
ROA 
+ 
0.100*** 0.136** 
(0.038)    (0.130)    
Grow 
+ 
0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.001)    (0.001)    
Lev 
+ 
0.028***     0.122***     
(0.009)    (0.048)    
Loss 
+ 
   0.045***    0.099*** 
(0.003)    (0.027)    
Tax 
− 
-0.001 -0.017 
(0.001)    (0.005)    
Demographic Controls  Yes Yes 
Observations 33,422 32,915 
R2 0.13 0.12 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Models are estimated using OLS, including 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. Each column reports the coefficient estimate followed by the standard error in 
parentheses. 
Variable Definitions: absAwca = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (computed through the Jones and 
DD Models); AggReligion = an aggregate measure of region-level religiosity; FirmSize = natural logarithm of total assets; 
FirmAge = the natural logarithm of the firm lifetime (in years); ROA = net income scaled by total assets; Grow = sales 
growth, defined as change in sales revenues scaled by sales revenues in year t-1; Lev = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
Loss = 1 if firm reported negative operating income in year t-1, 0 otherwise; Tax = natural logarithm of income tax;  
Population = natural logarithm of the population for each region in millions; Age = average age of residents in each region; 
Income = gross domestic product for each region (in EUR millions); Unemployment = percentage of unemployed resident 
population, by region; Education = percentage of resident population by region, with completed college education. 
 
Exp 
sign 
Sample A (Jones Model) Sample B (DD Model) 
(1) (2) 
Religiosity − 
-1.152**   -0.905*   
(0.586)    (0.91)    
CultArea − -0.002**    -0.007***    
 (0.001) (0.002) 
FirmSize 
+/− 
-0.007***     -0.011***     
(0.001)    (0.001)    
FirmAge 
− 
-0.006*** -0.006*** 
(0.001)    (0.001)    
ROA 
+ 
0.2940*** 0.330*** 
(0.021)    (0.034)    
Grow 
+ 
0.011*** 0.016*** 
(0.001)    (0.003)    
Lev 
+ 
0.018***     0.028***     
(0.004)    (0.009)    
Loss 
+ 
   0.027***    0.030*** 
(0.001)    (0.002)    
Tax 
− 
-0.002 -0.003 
(0.001)    (0.001)    
Demographic Controls  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 62,635 56,173 
R2 0.16 0.21 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Models are estimated using OLS, including 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. Each column reports the coefficient estimate followed by the standard error in 
parentheses. 
Variable Definitions: absAwca = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (computed through the Jones and 
DD Models); Religion = ratio of religious adherents in the region to the population in the region; CultArea = 1 if firm is 
located the district of Leiria (where Fátima sanctuary is located), 0 otherwise; FirmSize = natural logarithm of total assets; 
FirmAge = the natural logarithm of the firm lifetime (in years); ROA = net income scaled by total assets; Grow = sales 
growth, defined as change in sales revenues scaled by sales revenues in year t-1; Lev = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
Loss = 1 if firm reported negative operating income in year t-1, 0 otherwise; Tax = natural logarithm of income tax;  
Population = natural logarithm of the population for each region in millions; Age = average age of residents in each region; 
Income = gross domestic product for each region (in EUR millions); Unemployment = percentage of unemployed resident 
population, by region; Education = percentage of resident population by region, with completed college education. 
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Table 8. Religiosity and Earnings Quality in Firms with(without) External Financial Monitoring 
 
  
Exp 
sign 
Sample A (Jones Model) Sample B (DD Model) 
(1) Audited Firms (2) Non-audited 
Firms 
(3) Audited Firms (4) Non-audited 
Firms 
Religiosity − -0.060**   -0.030**   -0.110**   -0.057**   
(0.034)    (0.017)    (0.064)    (0.030)    
CultArea − -0.004**    -0.002**    -0.005*    -0.005***    
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
FirmSize +/− -0.003***     -0.005***     -0.007***     -0.010***     
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
FirmAge − -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
ROA + 0.417*** 0.466*** 0.322*** 0.313*** 
(0.037)    (0.026)    (0.035)    (0.021)    
Grow + 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
(0.003)    (0.001)    (0.003)    (0.001)    
Lev + 0.011***     0.018***     0.011**     0.013***     
(0.004)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.003)    
Loss +    0.025***    0.023***    0.027***    0.023*** 
(0.002)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002)    
Tax − -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Demographic Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,718 64,459 13,329 56,427 
R2 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.26 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. OLS regressions include robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. Each column reports the coefficient estimate followed by the standard error in parentheses. 
Variable Definitions: absAwca = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (computed through the Jones and 
DD Models); Religion = ratio of religious adherents in the region to the population in the region; CultArea = 1 if firm is 
located the district of Leiria (where Fátima sanctuary is located), 0 otherwise; FirmSize = natural logarithm of total assets; 
FirmAge = the natural logarithm of the firm lifetime (in years); ROA = net income scaled by total assets; Grow = sales 
growth, defined as change in sales revenues scaled by sales revenues in year t-1; Lev = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
Loss = 1 if firm reported negative operating income in year t-1, 0 otherwise; Tax = natural logarithm of income tax;  
Population = natural logarithm of the population for each region in millions; Age = average age of residents in each region; 
Income = gross domestic product for each region (in EUR millions); Unemployment = percentage of unemployed resident 
population, by region; Education = percentage of resident population by region, with completed college education;Urban 
=1 if firm is located in a urban region, 0 otherwise. 
